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less, the economic crisis, paired with eroding support for 
the government, started in 2006 in Hungary. The situa-
tion further deteriorated following the global fi nancial and 
economic crisis, which led to the change in government 
in 2010 when Fidesz won a two-thirds majority, became 
a party of constitutionalising capability and managed to 
keep its position through the 2014 and 2018 elections. 
Now, on the verge of the 2022 elections, one might won-
der what lies ahead.
Although a crucial and oft-cited element of the Fidesz 
government is that it represents and defends the interests 
of Hungarian people, it appears that the Hungarian peo-
ple are not that hostile toward the EU as their repeatedly 
re-elected government. It seems that, in line with the phe-
nomenon of rising public Euroscepticism all over Europe, 
Hungarian public support tended to decrease until 2012 
but has been on the rise since then despite the negative 
impact that one might expect due to the anti-EU govern-
ment rhetoric. The fact that general public opinion does 
not refl ect the changed elite discourse may be due to 
pragmatic attitudes towards the EU valuing the economic 
benefi ts that it represents (Lengyel and Göncz, 2010). An 
alternative explanation is that there is an increasing sat-
isfaction with Hungary’s economic and political perfor-
mance, which is refl ected in the attitudes of Hungarians 
towards the European integration project. Yet another 
possible explanation for the prevailing diffuse support for 
the EU in Hungary is based on emotional attachment or 
past identifi cation; however, despite being rather strong 
in Hungary, this element did not have a signifi cant impact 
on support for the EU (Lengyel and Göncz, 2010). In the 
following, attitudes of the general public as well as those 
of Hungarian political elites are considered.
Support for the European integration project in 
Hungary
The legitimacy and the stability of a political system partly 
comes from the general support for it. System theorists 
distinguish between specifi c support based on the per-
ception of the performance of a system and diffuse sup-
port representing a reservoir of positive attitudes towards 
a system that make people accept non-favourable out-
puts (Easton, 1965; Harteveld et al., 2013; Ringlerova, 
2015). Scholarly work supporting the European integra-
tion project mirrors this distinction as the main explana-
tory models elaborated so far revolve around utilitarian 
logic and explanations based on identifi cation that could 
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Hungary was perceived to be the “good student” among 
EU candidate countries in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
However, over the past decade, the relationship between 
the EU and Hungary has deteriorated. Hungary and spe-
cifi cally its Prime Minister since 2010, Viktor Orbán, are 
continually criticised for violating EU values and breaking 
rules of EU membership. On multiple occasions, Orbán 
and the Fidesz regime have implemented measures that 
question democracy, the rule of law, freedom of the press, 
academic freedom and minority rights among other 
things. The confrontational politics were accompanied by 
a very symbolic domestic communication about the EU 
based on populist anti-EU rhetoric; most recently, this dy-
namic led to Fidesz quitting the European People’s Party 
in March 2021.
Confrontations and negative domestic campaigns accom-
panied all stages of the EU’s multidimensional crisis start-
ing in 2008 with the global fi nancial meltdown that lead to 
the eurozone crisis, followed by the 2015 migrant crisis, the 
subsequent challenges of illiberalism in Hungary and Po-
land and the most recent adversities around the COVID-19 
pandemic. Different facets of the crises brought about dif-
ferent obstacles to European integration: supranational vs 
national solutions, the politicisation of the question and 
whether identity politics were activated (Börzel and Risse, 
2018) – all of which were well refl ected in the Hungarian 
government’s anti-EU campaigns.
At the time of Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004, 
there was a wide societal consensus about the benefi ts of 
EU membership for the country, while the general public 
discourse remained technical and pragmatic. Neverthe-
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neutral opinions (38%-45%). Figure 1 shows that 46% of 
Hungarians had a positive image of the EU in 2004 as op-
posed to 24% in 2012; most recently, positive perceptions 
climbed up to 49% in 2020. Similarly, 14% had a nega-
tive perception of the EU in 2004. This sentiment peaked 
in 2012 when it went up to around one-third of the popula-
tion and then decreased by 2020 to 12%. As we can see, 
while Hungary was among the most Eurosceptic countries 
in 2012, it was one of the most supportive ones by 2020.
Previous studies seem to confi rm that the elections might 
have a positive impact on the perceptions of the EU, opin-
ions generally being more positive in the year of elections – 
and this was the case in 2002 and 2006 (Lengyel and 
Göncz, 2010). However, with the change in government 
in 2010, this relation appears to be more blurred, perhaps 
due to the intense negative campaign against the EU after 
Fidesz took power in 2010. Despite the constant presence 
of negative discourses and campaigns from the govern-
ing elite since 2010, positive public perceptions of the EU 
increased. This raises several questions about the mecha-
nisms behind public opinions. While it has been suggested 
that utilitarianism had a more individual character in Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries (McLaren, 2006), utili-
tarian evaluations might have become even stronger after 
the fi nancial and subsequent economic crises (Hobolt and 
Wratil, 2015), which may be the reason why the Hungarian 
be considered manifestations of specifi c and diffuse sup-
port respectively. In utilitarian logic, attitudes are defi ned 
by a rational evaluation of the EU’s advantages and dis-
advantages at the individual or at the country level (e.g. 
Gabel, 1998; Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; McLaren, 2006), or 
explanations focused on the perception of the functioning 
of the EU, i.e. how effi cient one fi nds European institutions 
(e.g. Opp, 2005). Starting from the 2000s, identity-based 
explanations appear to challenge the utilitarian ones, with 
a focus on the impact of affective or emotional attachment 
to Europe based on perceptions of the European integra-
tion process (e.g. Duchesne and Frognier, 1995; Hooghe 
and Marks, 2005; Opp, 2005; Bruter, 2005; Risse, 2010). 
According to studies focusing on concepts such as identi-
ty, belonging to a group or loyalty, identity-based explana-
tions have an increased relevance among the general pub-
lic due to a lower level of cognitive capacities, knowledge 
of or interest in the issue (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Nev-
ertheless, the concept of European identity is very much 
contested in the academic community in terms of its con-
tent, plausibility or possible measurement (Favell, 2005).
Similarly, those arguing that the European integration 
process is too complicated or remote for ordinary people 
to understand or be interested in should remember that 
people might rely on familiar proxies in order to form an 
opinion. The domestic political arena and the perception 
of national political and economic performance is thus 
important as they create the partys’ stance and messag-
ing (e.g. Gabel, 1998; Anderson, 1998; Carrubba, 2001; 
Steenbergen et al., 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2009).
Attitudes of the general public
During the 1990s and early 2000s, there was a wide so-
cietal consensus in Hungary about its accession to the 
EU. This period was characterised by a broad public dis-
course about the “return” of the country to Europe. How-
ever, general positive attitudes were paired with wide-
spread ignorance. About one-third of the population had 
a positive perception of the EU’s objectives and activities, 
another one-third held a neutral opinion, and the remain-
ing third was divided between those without an opinion 
(21%-34%) and those opposed to the EU (6%-11%). Sup-
port for the country’s EU membership reached its peak 
in 2002 and began a steady decline thereafter (Lengyel 
and Göncz, 2010). Nevertheless, after a successful refer-
endum on the accession in 2003 with 84% in favour (albeit 
with a turnover of 46%), general support was still above 
the EU average at the time of the accession in 2004.
Data show that this decreasing tendency prevailed up un-
til 2012, but since then the share of positive perceptions 
follows an increasing tendency besides a steady share of 
Notes: The wording of the question is: “In general, does the European Un-
ion conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly nega-
tive or very negative image?”. Very/fairly positive and fairly/very negative 
are regrouped. There are several survey questions used to assess the 
general attitudes towards the EU and the perception of a country’s EU 
membership. The current question about the image of the EU is able to 
grasp general attitudes and has the advantage of being available for the 
entire period considered. Furthermore, despite the variety of questions 
and the specifi c advantages and limitations of each, according to previ-
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Perception of the political elite
After the post-socialist transformation of Hungary, there 
was an elite consensus about the Euro-Atlantic orienta-
tion. A large consensus accompanied the whole nego-
tiation process and accession of the country to the EU – 
only Fidesz, then the opposition party, expressed reser-
vations. Nevertheless, the Hungarian Parliament voted 
unanimously for accession. The 2010 elections, however, 
mirrored citizens’ dissatisfaction with the political elite 
and led to signifi cant changes in party structures and 
the national parliament. Fidesz won the elections while a 
right-wing extremist party Jobbik got into the parliament, 
and parties of the transition like the liberal SZDSZ and the 
conservative MDF disappeared. The change of the politi-
cal and economic context resulted in a signifi cant shift in 
public discourse about the EU as well as the EU increas-
ingly appearing in a negative light based on symbolic 
messages.
Previous studies point to the fact that either due to their 
higher exposure to EU matters or their status, European 
political elites hold more positive opinions about the EU 
than the general public. Hungary was not an exception to 
these trends up until the change in governance in 2010. 
However, by 2014 the views of Hungarian parlamentar-
ians changed to resemble those of the general public. In 
a political and economic context characterised by rising 
public Euroscepticism and an increasing gap between 
the public and their elites after the fi nancial and economic 
crisis, Hungary showed very different tendencies, as seen 
in Figure 3a. The gap fi rst increased and then strongly de-
creased by 2014 (Vogel and Göncz, 2018).
Although previous studies suggest that the polarisa-
tion of political elites in political issues should be higher 
than the polarisation of the general public (McAllister, 
1991), in terms of variation of opinions about European 
integration matters, elites are generally less polarised 
than the general public, but Hungary was an exception 
in 2014 (Vogel and Göncz, 2018). Besides these general 
tendencies, preferences for supranational institutional 
design prevailed in 2007 and 2009, while Hungarian 
parliamentarians became rather state-centred by 2014 
adopting a more intergovernmental idea of the Euro-
pean construct. Representatives of the dominant gov-
erning party, Fidesz, believed that European integration 
had gone too far, that the EU endangered Hungarian 
culture and generally trusted EU institutions less than 
the small oppositional groups of socialists and greens. 
In this respect, the dominant governing party differed 
sharply even from its almost invisible pro-EU Christian 
Democrat satellite. Nevertheless, even after the change 
in government, in 2014 the majority of parliamentar-
government’s negative messaging did not make a great 
impact.
Besides general attitudes, it is worthwhile to look at emo-
tional attachment as a potential measure of diffuse sup-
port, e.g. in the early 2000s, Hungarians seemed to be 
strongly attached to Europe, yet perception of the coun-
try’s EU membership was less enthusiastic (Lengyel and 
Göncz, 2010). Comparing Figures 1 and 2 reveals that 
attachment is higher than the positive evaluation of the 
EU. It is equally important, nevertheless, that these two 
measures follow similar trends. While in 2006, 63% of the 
population claimed to be very or somewhat attached to 
the EU, by 2012 this fi gure had decreased to 46% and 
increased again to 70% by 2020, putting Hungary in the 
ranks of the most Europhile countries. Similar to the previ-
ous survey of general perceptions of the EU, attachment 
was at its lowest in 2012 but increased again by 2020. 
Nevertheless, although Hungarians are quite attached to 
the European project, identifi cation has not proved to be 
a signifi cant determinant of the support for the EU in the 
past (Lengyel and Göncz, 2010).
Hungarian public opinion about the European integra-
tion process is not homogeneous either. Similar to other 
countries, education and urban environment seem to be a 
catalyst of the support. Furthermore, the embeddedness 
of the subject in the domestic political arena is very im-
portant.
Notes: The question is: “People may feel different degrees of attach-
ment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Eu-
rope. Please tell me how attached you feel to the European Union: Very 
attached/ Fairly attached/ Not very attached/ Not at all attached/ Don’t 
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It seems that the Hungarian general public is engaged 
with the European project even if the government – sup-
ported by the same public – is very critical about it. Taking 
into account the important embeddedness of the subject 
in the domestic political arena, this might seem a contra-
diction.
Looking at trust in institutions, a possible measure of per-
ception of the performance of a system and a measure of 
its legitimacy, one can see that trust in the EU is some-
what higher than trust in the national government in gen-
eral; however, this is even more pronounced in Hungary, 
at least in the period leading to the change in government 
in 2010 (see Figure 4). This gap closed, however, in the 
period 2017-2018, when trust in the two institutions was 
even. Trust in government has rather stagnated around 
47% since then, while trust in the EU increased some-
what. Looking at the period before 2010, it seems that 
trust in the government and trust in the EU follow similar 
tendencies, with trust a little higher around the elections 
before 2010 (spring 2006, spring 2010). This does not ap-
ply to the elections after 2010 when no change in gov-
ernance occurred. Similar to the tendencies presented 
earlier, 2012 is a negative peak in terms of trust in institu-
tions. On the other hand, since that low point, institutional 
trust follows a rather increasing tendency, especially with 
regards to the Hungarian government with opinions stag-
nating in the last two waves. This eventually points in the 
direction of a sociotropic utilitarian or cueing rationality 
logic, which states that the increasingly positive percep-
tion of the EU refl ects an increasing satisfaction with Hun-
gary’s economic and political performance – represented 
by a higher trust in the government.
ians still felt that the country has benefi ted from the EU 
membership (Göncz and Lengyel, 2016).
Attitudes in terms of attachment to Europe, on the other 
hand, proved to be more stable with a less notable differ-
ence between parliamentarians and the general public as 
well as less change over time (see Figure 3b).
What might the future hold?
The fact that the negative symbolic governmental mes-
sages and campaigns in Hungary did not have a dete-
riorating effect on the general support for the European 
integration process since 2012 may eventually be due to 
utilitarian logic, which might have prevented a signifi cant 
impact of symbolic messages and could represents the 
relevant frame of reference when evaluating the Euro-
pean integration process (McLaren, 2006; Lengyel and 
Göncz, 2010).
Notes: (a) The wording of the questions measuring the perceptions of the 
European integration project is: INTUNE/ENEC: “Some say European 
unifi cation should be strengthened. Others say it already has gone too 
far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-
scale. On this scale, “0” means unifi cation ‘has already gone too far’ and 
“10” means it ‘should be strengthened’”. EES: “Some say European uni-
fi cation should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. 
What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 
to 10, where “0” means ‘unifi cation has already gone too far’ and “10” 
means ‘it should be pushed further’”. (b) The wording of the questions 
measuring attachment is: INTUNE/ENEC: “People feel different degrees 
of attachment to their region, to their country and to Europe. What about 
you? Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached or not 
at all attached”. EES: “For each of the following statements, please tell 
me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion. You 
feel attached to Europe”. Answers: Yes, totally/ Yes, somewhat/ No, not 
really/ No, not at all. Values have been recoded so as to have the averages 
on a 0-3 scale, where 3 stands for “very attached”/ ”Yes, totally” and 0 
stands for “not attached at all”/ “No, not at all”.
Source: INTUNE (2007, 2009) and ENEC (2014) projects and the 2014 
Voter Study of the European Election Study for the general public in 2014 
(Vogel and Göncz, 2018).
Figure 3
Perception of the European integration project and 
attachment to Europe in Hungary among the general 
public and the political elites
Figure 4
Trust in national government and the EU in Hungary 
and in the European Union



















(a) Perception of the European (b) Attachment to Europe
averages on a 1-3 scaleintegration project 









































































































National government, EU average
European Union, EU average
%
Source: Eurobarometer.
Intereconomics 2021 | 2
90
Forum
The threat of an epidemic narrows the scope for politi-
cal competition. As Fidesz’s position within the EU has 
weakened signifi cantly with the withdrawal from the Eu-
ropean People’s Party, and the COVID-19 crisis is gener-
ating serious social tensions, the questions seem to be 
more open in the spring of 2022 than during the previous 
three elections.
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This raises a question about the outcome of the upcom-
ing Hungarian elections in 2022 as during all elections 
since 2010: Can the Fidesz government be voted out of 
offi ce? Despite high hopes from the united opposition, 
the level of public trust in the actual government sug-
gests caution.
It seems that the change in the political elites’ structure 
and rhetoric has not affected public attitudes towards the 
EU signifi cantly. Although previous research confi rmed 
the effect of media news on attitudes in questions related 
to the European integration project (Bruter, 2003), these 
do not seem to be refl ected in the Hungarian case. While 
anti-EU rhetoric started around 2010, Euroscepticism 
started to increase earlier and seems to be decreasing 
from 2012, although there were no changes in commu-
nication or political preferences of the government. Sev-
eral possible explanations arise. The most probable one 
is the suggestion that public opinion about the EU is very 
much utilitarian and pragmatic in Hungary and, despite 
government communications, EU membership still holds 
advantages for the country or at the individual level. An-
other possible explanation is that Hungarians are strong-
ly attached to European values, which indicates diffuse 
support and means that their attitudes towards the EU are 
less prone to change. This explanation is somewhat dis-
proved by previous fi ndings that identifi cation is not a key 
driver of general support in Hungary (Lengyel and Göncz, 
2010). A third possible explanation is that Hungarians are 
satisfi ed with the economic and political performance of 
the country under the Fidesz regime, proved by their in-
creasing trust in their government, and, as a “cue”, they 
extrapolate their satisfaction to the supranational level. 
In any case, trust in the Hungarian government seems to 
have stagnated since 2017, while trust in the EU is more 
volatile; still, according to the most recent data, it exceeds 
the trust in the Hungarian government.
All in all, the question of what drives the public attitudes in 
this case needs further research. A very practical implica-
tion of what has been described is the future of Hungary 
in the European Union: How much can the perception of 
a government be separated from the actual people (from 
the point of view of the EU)? How long will this gap be-
tween the governing elite’s discourse and public opinion 
be maintained? What will be the implications of the out-
come of the next elections of this question? And could the 
question of EU membership lead to an eventual change in 
governance?
It depends on how successfully Fidesz pursues blame-
game tactics concerning the EU, diverting attention 
from government failures and strengthening the clien-
tele, and how functional the opposition coalition will be. 
